

SUSTAINING COOPERATION IN TRUST GAMES

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ABSTRACT. It is well-known in evolutionary game theory that population clustering in Prisoner Dilemma games allows some cooperative strategies to invade populations of stable defecting strategies. We adapt this idea of population clustering to a two-person trust game. Without knowing it, players are typed based on their recent track record as to whether or not they are trusting (Players 1) and whether or not they are trustworthy (Players 2). They are then paired according to those types: trustors with trustworthy types, and similarly non-trustors with untrustworthy types. In the control comparisons, Players 1 are randomly repaired with Players 2 without regard to type. We ask: are there natural tendencies for people to cooperate more frequently in environments in which they experience more cooperation in comparison with controls?

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1. INTRODUCTION

There are two related problems of cooperation in bargaining environments. The first problem is to explain why and how people bargain their way to Pareto efficient, off-equilibrium path outcomes. This problem has received considerable attention in the recent literature (Guth, *et al.*, 1982; BDMc, 1995; Roth, 1995; Fehr and Gächter, 2000; McCabe, *et al.*, 2001). The second problem is to say how cooperation can be sustained once it emerges. The second problem has received comparably less attention than the first.

Even though sustaining cooperation has received less attention in bargaining situations, it has been a primary focus in Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) and public good games (Andreoni and Miller, 1993; Andreoni and Varian, 1999; Axelrod, 1984, 1997; Bohnet and Kübler, 2004; Kreps, *et al.*, 1982; Ledyard, 1995). Consider the analysis of the finitely repeated PD game in Axelrod (1984). In this game, always defecting is an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) in the sense that it does not pay to cooperate in a population where everyone else always defects. Yet a small band of conditional cooperators (say, tit-for-tat players) can invade a population of unconditional defectors provided that the cooperators can *cluster*. That is, if these cooperators interact more often with each other than with the defectors (or if the result of two cooperators meeting is advantageous enough), then the population can be invaded. For clustering to work, though, it must be the case that the probability of two members of the relevant subpopulation meeting is not the same as the probability of two arbitrary members of the population at large meeting. The problem in populations without clustering is that the chance of members from a small band of conditional cooperators meeting each other is comparatively low.

We want to adapt this idea of population clustering to a simple two-person trust game. The clustering in our trust game will be a function of recent behavior in this bargaining environment. An agent's history of choices gives him a track record. Players can be typed based on their recent track record as whether or not they are trusting (for Players 1), and whether or not they are trustworthy (for Players 2). Once the players are typed, they can then be paired according to those types: trustors with trustworthy types, and similarly non-trustors with untrustworthy types. If some people are inclined to trust, this sort of matching protocol will induce self-selection clustering within the population. The empirical question that we want to address is whether this adaptation of clustering to bargaining environments can sustain cooperative play analogous to the situation in finitely repeated PD games. That is,

if cooperative play emerges in the trust game, can the level be maintained via an endogenous matching rule? This paper studies the effect of an experimental treatment controlling for the history of cooperation by procedures unknown to the subjects so that cooperation is not sustained by common knowledge and expectations about the particular clustering mechanism in the population.

Why do we use a procedure in which subjects are not informed that cooperation (defection) will result in their being matched with people who are also likely to cooperate (defect)? We want to inquire whether the experience of cooperation reinforces innate tendencies to cooperate causing it to grow relative to the occurrence of defection behavior, and we want to do this without contaminating the measurements with advantages gained by cooperative behavior deliberately chosen to gain access to other cooperators. We want potential cooperators to discover they are in an environment conducive to cooperation and then to do whatever comes naturally; not strategically choose that environment because it is incentive compatible. The equilibrium of the game is no longer to defect, if defection reduces one's access to those likely to cooperate. We do not reveal the matching algorithm because the research hypothesis is not about behavior when people *know* they are matched with someone likely to cooperate. Rather, it is about what people do who, *contrary* to their immediate game theoretic self-interest, initiate or reciprocate cooperation, and who find themselves in an environment with other similarly disposed people. Does cooperation build, or does it deteriorate among such individuals?

In the next section we describe a two-person extensive-form trust game and our mechanism for clustering the population. We then discuss the design which consists of two treatments: the baseline where players are matched randomly and another where liked types have an increased likelihood of interacting and procedures (Section 3). Data analysis follows in Section 4 and concluding remarks are contained in Section 5.

2. SUSTAINING TRUST

In the trust game pictured in Figure 1, Player 1 is asked to choose from the following: (1) You are given \$40, which you can split evenly with another person—Player 2—in which case the game is over or (2) You present Player 2 with two choices, either Player 2 can take \$30 out of \$45, leaving you \$15; or she can split \$50 evenly between the two of you. Player 1 faces a \$5 opportunity cost to interact with Player 2.




FIGURE 1. Trust game

A standard backward induction argument verifies that the unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of this game is the $(20, 20)$ outcome determined by the pure strategy (R, d) : a rational Player 2 would strictly prefer \$30 to \$25, and so would choose *down* (d) at her decision node; knowing this a rational, self-interested Player 1, who prefers \$20 to \$15, would therefore choose *Right* (R) at his decision node.

Although the pure strategy profile (R, d) is the unique SPE, it is not an evolutionary stable strategy: (R, d) is a Nash equilibrium but it is not strict, and thus cannot be an ESS (Weibull, 1995, Proposition 5.1). Intuitively, the situation is this. Consider a population in which Players 1 all play R and Players 2 all play d . Players 2 are susceptible to a certain amount of drift: a mutant Player 2 who would play r were she given the chance has the same fitness as a non-mutant Player 2. So selection pressures cannot rule out that such mutant Players 2 will thrive equally as well as their non-mutant peers. Consequently, a mutant Player 1 who plays D instead of R may well meet a mutant Player 2. If the proportion of mutant Players 2 is high enough, then such a Player 1 will achieve a higher level of fitness than his non-mutant peers, namely a payoff of 20. And so it cannot be ruled out that the population of (R, d) players will be destabilized due to the drift of Player 2 and subsequent mutation of Player 1.

This raises the empirical question with which we are concerned. Since (R, d) is not an ESS we know that it is *possible* for cooperation to emerge in this environment. What we want to know is what the behavioral and institutional preconditions are for such cooperation to actually emerge and be sustained. This is an empirical question. In particular, is the mere

possibility of random drift enough to allow cooperation to emerge and be sustained, or can the level of cooperation and its stability be encouraged by population clustering?

2.1. Clustering in the Trust Game. We implement the idea of clustering by typing players based on their observed moves in the trust game above, and in one treatment match players based on their types. Types come in the form of a “trust score”, τ_n^j , where $j=1$ or 2 for player role, n indicates the round, and $\tau \in [0, 1]$. τ is defined algorithmically. See Appendix A for a detailed description of the algorithms for both players. A move by Player i is labeled a defection move just in case it is i 's strategy in the subgame perfect strategy profile. A move by Player i is labeled a cooperative move just in case it is not a defection move. The idea is each player will have a score that is updated following each round. A player's trust score is essentially a fraction, where the numerator is the number of times the player has cooperated, and the denominator is the number of chances the player has had to cooperate.

If Player 1 chooses a cooperative move, then the numerator of their trust score is incremented by 1; otherwise it remains the same. If the current Round $n \leq 5$, then the denominator of their trust score is n ; otherwise it is 5. That the divisor, when $n > 5$, is always 5 puts a premium on the last five interactions of the players. Pre-theoretically, there is a recency effect of goodwill—recent acts of goodwill overshadow distant acts of ill-will and vice versa. The trust score algorithm for Player 1 codifies this intuition by only keeping track of the behavior over the most recent five rounds.

To compute the trust score of a Player 2 after Round n , we need to first compute the number of times that Player 2 has had an opportunity to make a choice—the idea being that her trust score should neither be incremented nor decremented in cases where Player 1 chooses his outside option.¹ This will be recorded as Player 2's *opportunity score*. We need to make a similar allowance to codify the recency effect of trust and trustworthiness. Instead

¹Why would one adopt a prior that observing Player 1 defect would not affect Player 2's cooperative propensities? One might indeed think that a Player 2's trust score should be decremented in cases where Player 1 chooses his outside option; the idea being that Player 2's cooperative propensity, in such cases, gets infected by the observation of non-cooperative play by Player 1. Whether or not some portion of the population reacts in this way is an empirical question. But even assuming this view is correct, the result of using our trust score algorithms (which are not sensitive to this posited behavior) in the matching experiments would be that some Players 2 have an artificially high trust score. Thus, when matched according to trust scores, some such Players 2 may be matched with (real) trusting Players 1. But notice that this would make the observation of sustained cooperative play rather more difficult to achieve. Hence, if the experimental results indicate such

of tracking the behavior of Player 2 (for the purposes of computing her trust score) over the most recent five rounds, we need instead track it over the most recent five rounds *in which she had an opportunity to make a decision*. We simply need to verify if Player 1 moved down (right), in which case Player 2's opportunity score is (not) incremented. We will call this queue her *omega queue*. Player 2's trust score is calculated almost exactly as Player 1's, but the denominator is opportunity score, rather than round.

We assume that both Player 1 and Player 2 begin with a trust score of zero. At the end of each round, the algorithm begins by looping through the decisions made by all the Players 1 and calculating their respective score and then does the same for all the Players 2. At the completion of each round, each player has a trust score that essentially tracks the relative frequency of cooperative moves up to that round.

2.2. Experimental Treatments. The two treatments reported below differ according to their *matching protocol*. In the baseline condition—the Random treatment— subjects are *randomly* paired each period. Trust scores in the Random treatment are tracked, but not used in matching Players 1 and Players 2. The experimental treatment—the Sorted treatment— *pairs subjects according to their trust scores*. The matching protocol for the Sorted treatment is straightforward: At the end of Round n Players 1 are rank-ordered by their trust scores (high to low). Similarly for Players 2. Then the matching rule simply pairs the highest ranked Player 1 with the highest ranked Player 2 for interaction in Round $n + 1$, the next to highest ranked Player 1 with the next to highest ranked Player 2 for interaction in Round $n + 1$, and so on.²

3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES

Our experiments were conducted with undergraduate students from a variety of majors at The University of Arizona. A total of eight experimental sessions were run: four sessions of the Sorted treatment and four sessions of the Random treatment.³ Each experimental session consisted of 16 subjects.⁴

sustained cooperative behavior even using our scoring algorithms, then those results should be thought of as rather robust.

²Ties in trust scores are broken randomly.

³The first session was run on 09/05/00. In order to control for some variability we ran all of the sessions at the same time of day, taking two weeks to complete.

⁴Two randomized treatments only had 14 subjects due to no shows.

| | Sessions | Subjects | Observations |
|---------------|----------|----------|--------------|
| Sorted | 4 | 64 | 1280 |
| Random | 4 | 60 | 1200 |

TABLE 1. Experimental Design

A subject is paid \$5 for showing up on time and immediately (and randomly) seated at a computer terminal in a large room containing 40 terminals. Each terminal is in a separate cubicle, and the subjects are dispersed so that no subject can see the terminal screen of another. Each person is randomly assigned a role (Player 1 or 2) and keeps this role for the entirety of the experiment. The instructions for each experiment do not use words like ‘game’, ‘play’, ‘player’, ‘opponent’, ‘partner’, ‘trust’, etc.; rather neutral terms such as ‘decision problem’, ‘decision maker 1 (DM1)’, ‘DM2’, ‘your counterpart’, etc. are used in order to provide a baseline context.

The interactions in the experiment consist of anonymous pairings in a computerized game. By using a mouse, each Player 1 can click on the right or down arrows. A player confirms his choice by clicking on a “Send” button. This move information is then displayed on their counterpart’s screen. If Player 1 moves down, Player 2 would be prompted to click on the right or down arrow (again confirming her choice by clicking on a “Send” button). This move information is then displayed on Player 1’s screen. Earnings are shown to both Player 1 and Player 2 after each period. The game is sequential in structure—i.e. we do not employ the strategy method to elicit choices. Subjects respond to actual move information when making a decision.

The payoffs represent the experimental dollar amounts the subjects could earn with an exchange rate of 20 experimental dollars equal to 1 U.S. dollar; both the payoffs and the exchange rate are common information. The games were played sequentially for 20 periods, although the subjects do not know the total number of periods until the session is complete.⁵

⁵The subjects did know that they were recruited for a one-hour experiment and each of the sessions lasted almost the entire time. It is true that by not revealing the end point to the subjects, we may have introduced a bias in favor of seeing more cooperation relative to a condition where subjects know the end point. However, that being said, the information the subjects have is the same across treatments, and we are interested in comparison of treatments so we do not worry too much about this potential bias in our results.

At the end of the experiment, their accumulated earnings were paid to them privately (single-blind protocol). The experiments lasted on average a little under one hour, from arrival to completion. Subjects' earnings (not including the show-up fee) average \$21.00 ($s = 1.8$) in the Random treatment and \$23.00 ($s = 2.1$) in the Sorted treatment. The subjects did not have prior experience with this environment or others like it. Each subject participated in one and only one such experiment. See Table 1 for a summary of the experimental design.

The instructions stated the following about matching (see Appendix B for detailed instructions): “*Each period you will be paired with another individual: your counterpart for that period. You will participate for several periods, being re-paired each period.*” We did not reveal the exact assignment rule to any of the subjects because we were concerned that such information might generate a difference in strategic behavior. This is especially the case in the Sorted environment—knowing that cooperators are being matched each period might lead individuals to alter their type for strategic reasons rather than due to reciprocity type motives.

Anonymously matched subjects in a single play trust game have a strong incentive to choose dominant strategies and to expect the same of their counterpart. They have no knowledge of the types with which they are paired, yet many subjects exhibit trusting/trustworthy behavior. Since they make more money than if they play non-cooperatively, they can hardly be said not to be rational. If such behavior is deeply ingrained in a subset of every sample of subjects, then the greater experience of reciprocity in repeat interaction, the greater should be the use of such strategies by these subjects. The sorting protocol enables clustering to occur while controlling for the information that would allow clustering to be the deliberate, constructively rational choice of those who otherwise would choose non-cooperatively.

4. RESULTS

Table 2 provides the conditional outcome frequencies by blocks of five trials for the Sorted and Random conditions. Note that in the first trial block (rounds 1–5) roughly half of the play occurs at the SPE in both treatments and about half of the cooperative ventures by Player 1 are reciprocated. There is not a statistically significant difference between either the amount of play which reaches the SPE ($p = 0.4691$) or the amount of play which reaches the efficient outcome ($p = 0.5775$).⁶ By the second trial block, however, there are significant differences

⁶ p -values being reported are from two sample t-tests examining whether or not the means in question are different, unless otherwise noted.

in the mean proportion of outcomes across treatments. This is most pronounced in the last trial block. When subjects are sorted based on their trust scores there are far fewer pairs ending up at the SPE; when subjects are sorted, more pairs reach the cooperative outcome than when they are randomly matched each round. Players 1 reach the SPE 46.88% of the time in the Sorted treatment as compared to 72.67% in the Random treatment ($p = 0.0088$). Furthermore, Players 2 who are paired with trusting Players 1 respond in kind in the Sorted treatment 83.53% of the time compared with 51.22% of the time in the Random treatment ($p = 0.0128$).⁷ One question is how well trusting Players 1 do compared to playing the SPE outcome in both treatments. In the Sorted treatment, the expected value of trust based on the average frequencies of cooperation and defection moves by Players 2 is \$22.29.⁸ In the Random treatment, the expected value of trust based on the average frequencies of cooperation and defection moves by Players 2 is \$19.49.⁹ So in the Sorted treatment, it pays for the Players 1 to be trusting; this is not the case in the Random treatment.

The above is aggregated in trial blocks. The dynamics of play over time reveals the same trends, albeit more graphically. Figures 2 and 3 show the mean fraction of each type of play over the 20 rounds for both treatment conditions. The trends are unmistakable: as play proceeds through the later rounds, cooperation emerges and is sustained among the sorted subjects, but there is no similar round-effect for the randomly paired subjects.

4.1. Trust Scores. Along these same lines, it is interesting to look at the trust scores.¹⁰ Remember that in both the Random and Sorted treatment a trust score is calculated for each player based on their decisions, but only the Sorted treatment matches players according

⁷It was interesting watching the results come in from these experiments. What was easy to observe is that by Round 10 in the Sorted treatment around half of the Players 1 were playing SPE (i.e. playing Right), so their trust scores began deteriorating rapidly and about half were trusting (i.e., playing Down), keeping their trust scores near the maximum. Most of the trusting interactions were met with trustworthiness by their counterpart, keeping more than half of the Players 2 trust scores high as well. This was not the case in the Random treatment.

⁸ $EV(\text{trust}|\text{sorted}) = 0.7288(\$25) + 0.2712(\$15) = \$22.288 > \$20 = EV(\text{spe})$.

⁹ $EV(\text{trust}|\text{random}) = 0.4485(\$25) + 0.5515(\$15) = \$19.485 < \$20 = EV(\text{spe})$.

¹⁰One potential concern about our particular algorithm is given the sequential nature of the game Players' 2 trust scores are slow to increment. However, Player 2's first chance (second chance) to move occurs early in the Sorted treatment—round 2.34 (round 4.56). This is not significantly different from the Random treatment. Since Players' 2 first and second opportunity to move occurs early in the game, their trust scores are in fact not slow to be incremented.

| | Player 1 | | Player 2 | |
|---------------|--------------|-----------|-----------------|---------------------|
| Trials | No Trust (%) | Trust (%) | Trustworthy (%) | Not Trustworthy (%) |
| Sorted | | | | |
| 1–5 | 46.25 | 53.75 | 51.16 | 48.84 |
| 6–10 | 50.00 | 50.00 | 72.50 | 27.50 |
| 11–15 | 48.13 | 51.88 | 84.34 | 15.66 |
| 16–20 | 46.88 | 53.13 | 83.53 | 16.47 |
| Random | | | | |
| 1–5 | 48.67 | 51.33 | 46.75 | 53.25 |
| 6–10 | 62.67 | 37.33 | 42.86 | 57.14 |
| 11–15 | 62.00 | 38.00 | 38.60 | 61.40 |
| 16–20 | 72.67 | 27.33 | 51.22 | 48.78 |

TABLE 2. Conditional Outcomes by Trial Block




FIGURE 2. Percent of Players 1 Trusting Over Time

to their score. Since the trust scores track the behavioral data, it is not surprising that an examination of the scores tells a very similar story to that of the outcome frequencies. The average trust score over the first 10 rounds—slightly smaller than a half—is statistically the




FIGURE 3. Percent of Players 2 Cooperating Over Time

same for the two treatments ($p = .4850$ for 1–5 and $p = .2690$ for 6–10, using a Kolmogorov–Smirnov test for equality of distributions). However, in the last 10 rounds the trust scores are significantly higher under the Sorted condition than in the Random, with an average of 0.5 in the former and 0.36 in the latter ($p = .0000$ for 11–15 and $p = .0000$ for 16–20, using a K–S test).

Figures 4 and 5 allow comparison of the number of people (i.e., COUNT) with a particular trust score over time across the two conditions. Notice that COUNT for those with the lowest trust score ($\tau_1^j \leq 0.1$) is the *same* across treatments, and COUNT for those with the highest trust score ($\tau_1^j = 1$) following round 1 is the *same* across treatments indicating the two treatments have the same initial conditions for the number of people with low and high trust scores. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the trends for the number of people with the lowest trust score is also the same across the two treatments, yet the trends for $\tau_n^j = 1$ differ dramatically. In Random, there is a significant drop in the number of people with the maximum trust score, demonstrated by the flattening of the height of the bar of $\tau_n^j = 1$ as ROUND increases from 1 to 20, whereas in Sorted there is significant growth in the number of players with the maximum trust score, seen in the growth of the peak $\tau_n^j = 1$ (especially after ROUND 10). Our sorting mechanism has little effect on those at the extremely low end of the trust/trustworthy spectrum, but it does have a dramatic impact on the *high end* of the cooperative spectrum. In Random, there is significant noise in the population as is indicated

by the amount of players in the middle of the trust score range. However, in Sorted these “middle players” get pushed into the high range with the result that the population becomes much more segregated under sorting.




FIGURE 4. Trust Score Landscape: Random




FIGURE 5. Trust Score Landscape: Sorted

4.2. Trust and Trustworthiness. Here we report logit regression results which examine Players 1 trust and Players 2 trustworthiness over time (see Table 3). The data columns for Trust shows the logit coefficient estimates and t -statistics for the regression of $\ln \frac{p(t)}{1-p(t)}$, $t = 1, 2, \dots, 20$, where $p(t)$ is the probability a Player 1 is trusting (i.e., moves Down) in Round t , and $1 - p(t)$ is the probability that Player 1 will not be trusting. The independent variables are Round, which takes on the values of $1, 2, \dots, 20$; PartnerCoop $_{t-1}$, a dummy variable with a value of 1 if Player 1's counterpart cooperated in the previous round (i.e., moved Right), 0 otherwise; and $Rnd \times Treat$ is the interaction effect between Round and Treat, where Treat is a dummy variable with a value of 1 for the Sorted treatment, 0 for the Random treatment.¹¹ The Round coefficient is negative, but small in magnitude. The highly significant coefficient for PartnerCoop $_{t-1}$ indicates that the odds of trusting behavior by Players 1 are much higher in Round t following a Round where the cooperative outcome was reached. The highly significant interaction term, $Rnd \times Treat$, indicates that the essence of the treatment effect involves the interaction between Round and treatment. Trust needs time to develop, and is more likely to develop over time in the Sorted treatment.

The data columns for Trustworthy shows the logit coefficient estimates and t -statistics for the regression of $\ln \frac{p(t)}{1-p(t)}$, $t = 1, 2, \dots, 20$, where $p(t)$ is the probability a Player 2 is trustworthy (i.e., moves right) in Round t , and $1 - p(t)$ is the probability that Player 2 is not trustworthy. The independent variables are Round, which takes on the values of $1, 2, \dots, 20$; PartnerTrust $_{t-1}$, a dummy variable with a value of 1 if Player 2's counterpart trusted in the previous round (i.e., moved Down), 0 otherwise; and $Rnd \times Treat$ is the interaction effect between Round and Treat, where Treat is a dummy variable with a value of 1 for the Sorted treatment, 0 for the Random treatment.¹² The Round coefficient is negative, but small in magnitude. The highly significant coefficient for PartnerTrust $_{t-1}$ indicates that the odds of trustworthy behavior by Players 2 are much higher in Round t following a Round where the counterpart attempted cooperation. The highly significant interaction term, $Rnd \times Treat$, again indicates that the essence of the treatment effect involves the interaction between Round and treatment. Trustworthiness needs time to develop, and is more likely to develop over time

¹¹These results are robust to replacing PartnerCoop $_{t-1}$ with ITYPE, a dummy variable with a value of 1 if Player 1 is an initial cooperator, 0 otherwise—although the pseudo R^2 drops.

¹²These results are robust to replacing PartnerCoop $_{t-1}$ with ITYPE, a dummy variable with a value of 1 if Player 1 is an initial cooperator, 0 otherwise.

| | Trust | | Trustworthy | | |
|---------------------------------------|--------|---------------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------|-----------|
| | Coeff. | <i>t</i> -stat | Coeff. | <i>t</i> -stat | |
| Constant | -.305 | -2.24** | Constant | -1.99 | -11.35*** |
| Round | -.06 | -4.62*** | Round | -.04 | -2.41*** |
| PartnerCoop _{<i>t</i>-1} | 3.52 | 15.19*** | PartnerTrust _{<i>t</i>-1} | 1.54 | 10.68*** |
| <i>Rnd</i> × <i>Treat</i> | 1.04 | 3.67*** | <i>Rnd</i> × <i>Treat</i> | .094 | 7.52*** |
| <i>N</i> = 1240 | | <i>N</i> = 1240 | | | |
| pseudo <i>R</i> ² = 0.2689 | | pseudo <i>R</i> ² = 0.1456 | | | |

* *p*-values: * ≤ 0.05, ** ≤ .01, *** ≤ .001.

TABLE 3. Trust and Trustworthiness Logits

in the Sorted treatment. Overall, then, the econometric results indicate that there is a significant divergence in the level of cooperative behavior being achieved over time across the two treatments.

4.3. Efficiency Measure. In every interaction in this environment every joint decision affects more than merely one’s own monetary costs and benefits. Each player’s trust score is also affected.¹³ Also at stake are the gains from exchange, and in particular we can think of whether or not the players actually achieve the efficient allocation—that is, whether they reach the off-equilibrium cooperative outcome or not. There is a strong intuition that a good mechanism is one which rewards those who have a history of trusting/trustworthy behavior: such agents should get what they deserve. In the present context this means that if a person has a history of trusting/trustworthy behavior prior to a certain interaction, then there ought to be a premium on her reaching the cooperative outcome in that interaction. This is a “social variable” in the sense that it is sensitive to more than just one’s own payoffs and actions, since one’s counterpart has a role in determining whether or not the cooperative outcome is reached. A society has an interest in seeing agents with high values of such a variable.

We can capture what is significant about this dimension of social value by introducing a score for each player *j* at round *n*, $\nu_n^j \in [0, 1]$. We will call ν_n^j Player *j*’s *efficiency score* at round *n*. From the point of view of an agent *j* getting what she deserves, the best

¹³The subjects, of course, do not know that the value of such a score is at stake. But this does not change the fact that every joint decision reached by a pair of subjects affects each subject’s trust score.

outcome is if j is maximally trusting/trustworthy up to round n and also reaches the cooperative outcome in n . Conversely, it is far less desirable, socially speaking, if a maximally untrusting/untrustworthy agent up to round n finds himself at the cooperative outcome or a maximally trusting/trustworthy agent finds herself defected upon. Clearly ranking below both of these is the desirability of maximally untrusting/untrustworthy agents acting in ways consonant with their histories. With this in mind, then, we define ν_n^j as follows:

$$\nu_n^j = \frac{\tau_n^j + d}{2}$$

where $d = 0$ if Player j did not reach the cooperative outcome in Round n and $d = 1$ if she did. This variable tracks how efficient play is with respect to the potential social gains, in the sense described above, to be had from exchange.

The efficiency scores begin in Round 1 at less than 0.40 for both treatments and remain similar in magnitude through, roughly, the first nine rounds. However, in the later rounds, the efficiency being achieved in each condition is significantly different: in the last trial block the average efficiency score in the Sorted treatment is 0.48; whereas in the Random treatment it is 0.25 ($p = .0333$). The level of efficiency with respect to achieving *both* high trust scores and reaching the cooperative outcome is significantly greater when subjects are being matched according to their trust score.

4.4. Types and Outcome. Is cooperation being “crowded out” in the Random treatment? That is, supposing that the initial propensity to cooperate among subjects is the same across treatments, then the fact that behavior tends toward high levels of repeated cooperative play in the Sorted treatment, and the fact that behavior tends toward subgame perfect play in the Random treatment would indeed be evidence that cooperative behavior is reinforced in the Sorted treatment and crowded out (or undermined) in the Random treatment. To examine this question, we can classify subjects as either a non-cooperator or cooperator based on their first observed move.¹⁴ Players 1 are a non-cooperating type if in Round 1 they chose (20, 20) and a cooperating type if they chose to play down, passing the game to their counterpart. Similarly, for Players 2. A Player 2 is a non-cooperating type if when her counterpart first played down, she chose the defection outcome (15, 30), and a Player 2 is a cooperating type

¹⁴Basing type on only the first observed move attempts classification of agents according to their innate tendencies toward cooperation. The first observed move by a Player 2 occurs early: in the Sorted treatment the median is 1.5 rounds and in the Random treatment it is round 1.

| | Random | Sorted |
|----------------|---------------|---------------|
| Coop | 16/14* | 17/17 |
| NonCoop | 14/16 | 15/15 |

* a/b where a = number of P1s, b = number of P2s.

TABLE 4. Distribution of Initial Player Types

if she chose the cooperative outcome (25, 25) on her first available move. See Table 4 for the distribution of initial player types, in which rows indicate initial player types and columns indicate the matching protocol. Note that the initial distribution of player types is the same across treatments. Once we establish this typing, we can analyze how play differs among these groups depending on whether they are being sorted by their trust scores or simply being randomly re-paired. We want to focus on the last 10 rounds in particular (see Figure 6). Initial cooperators fare much better when they are meeting other cooperators under the sorting mechanism than when they randomly meet their counterparts—the last 10 interactions result in an outcome of (25, 25) 62% of the time in the Sorted treatment compared to only 18% of the time in the Random treatment ($p = .0000$). This is not the case for initial non-cooperative types. In fact, there is no treatment effect for the defecting types: the percentage of cooperative outcomes reached in the last 10 rounds is not statistically different between the Random and Sorted treatments ($p = .1187$). This suggests that cooperation is crowded out in the Random treatment and fostered in the Sorted treatment.

4.5. **Summary.** Here are the four central results from this sorting experiment:

Result 1. In the last 10 rounds, the fraction of subjects reaching the SPE is dramatically lower in the Sorted treatment than in the Random treatment.

Result 2. In the last 10 rounds, the fraction of subjects reaching the cooperative outcome is significantly higher in the Sorted treatment than in the Random treatment.

Result 3. The average efficiency score, i.e. how efficient play is with respect to the potential social benefit, is higher in the Sorted treatment than in the Random treatment.

Result 4. In the last 10 rounds, the number of cooperative player types reaching cooperative outcomes is far greater in the Sorted treatment than in the Random treatment; therefore




FIGURE 6. Cooperators—Trustors/Trustworthy on initial decision versus Non-cooperators—No Trust/Non-Trustworthy on initial decision: Percent of Each Type Reaching the Cooperative Outcome of (25, 25) in the Last 10 Rounds

there are efficiency gains from the matching mechanism. There is no treatment effect for non-cooperative types.

5. CONCLUSIONS

It is well-known in evolutionary game theory that population clustering in PD games allows for some cooperative strategies to invade populations of stable defecting strategies. Similarly, in the experimental community there are results which suggest that a similar “clustering” phenomenon can be induced among subjects in public goods games to sustain high levels of contributions (Gunnthorsdottir, *et al.*, 2000). The results of the sorting experiments here suggest a similar story about behavior in simple two-person bargaining games. Since the SPE in our trust game is not a strict Nash Equilibrium, (R, d) is not an ESS. Thus, we know that it is, in principle, possible for cooperative play to emerge randomly due to evolutionary drift of Players 2. But we find no behavioral evidence of significant cooperative play which can be attributed to random drift and mutation in the population. This is because in the Random treatment the level of efficient outcomes is low and initial cooperators seem to be crowded out of the environment. On the other hand, we do find strong evidence that a behavioral clustering mechanism in this sequential bargaining game increases cooperative play significantly over levels reached by players randomly meeting. Sorting subjects by trust scores accomplishes two tasks. First, it allows cooperative play which is Pareto-superior to the SPE to emerge. Second, once cooperative play emerges, sorting subjects does not allow this

behavior to be “infected” and compromised by either defecting Players 2 or by untrusting Players 1. Moreover, the emergence of cooperation is a response to the experience of an environment of cooperative types, rather than a strategic choice to enter such an environment.

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APPENDIX A. TRUST SCORE ALGORITHMS

Algorithm 1 (Player 1 Trust Score). Let c_1 (d_1) indicate a cooperative (defection) move by Player 1. Then the trust score of a Player 1 after Round n , τ_n^1 , is given by the following algorithm:

- (1) If $n = 0$: $\tau_0^1 = 0$
- (2) If $n \leq 5$: Let k be the number of c_1 moves through Round $n - 1$. Then:

$$\tau_n^1 = \begin{cases} \frac{k}{n} & \text{if } d_1 \text{ in Round } n \\ \frac{k+1}{n} & \text{if } c_1 \text{ in Round } n \end{cases}$$
- (3) If $n > 5$: Let k be the number of c_1 moves in Rounds $n - 1, \dots, n - 4$. Then:

$$\tau_n^1 = \begin{cases} \frac{k}{5} & \text{if } d_1 \text{ in Round } n \\ \frac{k+1}{5} & \text{if } c_1 \text{ in Round } n \end{cases}$$

Algorithm 2 (Player 2 Opportunity Score, Omega Queue). Let c_1 (d_1) indicate a cooperative (defection) move by Player 1, and let c_2 (d_2) indicate a cooperative (defection) move by Player 2. Then Player 2's *opportunity score in Round n* , ρ_n , is given by the following algorithm:

- (1) If $n = 0$: $\rho_0 = 0$
- (2) If $n \geq 1$:

$$\rho_n = \begin{cases} \rho_{n-1} & \text{if } d_1 \text{ in Round } n \\ \rho_{n-1} + 1 & \text{if } c_1 \text{ in Round } n \end{cases}$$

Where $n \geq 5$, let Ω_{n-1} be the four most recent rounds prior to Round n in which Player 2 has had a chance to move.

Algorithm 3 (Player 2 Trust Score). Let c_2 (d_2) indicate a cooperative (defection) move by Player 2. Then the trust score of a Player 2 after Round n , τ_n^2 , is given by the following algorithm:

- (1) If $n = 0$: $\tau_0^2 = 0$
- (2) If $\rho_n = \rho_{n-1}$: $\tau_n^2 = \tau_{n-1}^2$
- (3) If $\rho_n \neq \rho_{n-1}$, $\rho_n \leq 5$, and $n \leq 5$: Let k be the number of c_2 moves through Round $n - 1$. Then:

$$\tau_n^2 = \begin{cases} \frac{k}{\rho_n} & \text{if } d_2 \text{ in Round } n \\ \frac{k+1}{\rho_n} & \text{if } c_2 \text{ in Round } n \end{cases}$$
- (4) If $\rho_n \neq \rho_{n-1}$, $\rho_n \leq 5$, and $n > 5$: Let k be the number of c_2 moves in Ω_{n-1} . Then:

$$\tau_n^2 = \begin{cases} \frac{k}{\rho_n} & \text{if } d_2 \text{ in Round } n \\ \frac{k+1}{\rho_n} & \text{if } c_2 \text{ in Round } n \end{cases}$$

(5) If $\rho_n \neq \rho_{n-1}$ and $\rho_n \geq 5$: Let k be the number of c_2 moves in Ω_{n-1} . Then:

$$\tau_n^2 = \begin{cases} \frac{k}{5} & \text{if } d_2 \text{ in Round } n \\ \frac{k+1}{5} & \text{if } c_2 \text{ in Round } n \end{cases}$$

APPENDIX B. COMPUTERIZED INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE BOTH TREATMENTS

Page 1

In this experiment you will participate in a series of two person decision problems. The experiment will last for several periods. Each period you will be paired with another individual: your counterpart for that period. The joint decisions made by you and your counterpart for that period will determine how much money you will earn in that period. After each period you will be re-paired.

Your earnings will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. We will not tell anyone else your earnings. We ask that you do not discuss your earnings with anyone else. Please read the following instructions carefully. If you have a question at any time, please raise your hand and someone will come by to help.

Page 2

Notice that another button, “Back”, has appeared at the bottom of the page. If at any time you wish to return to a previous page, click “Back”. To continue reading the directions, click “Next”.

Page 3

You will see a diagram similar to this one at the beginning of the experiment. You and another person will participate in a decision problem like the diagram below. We will refer to this other person as your counterpart.

SCREEN DIAGRAM

One of you will be DM 1. The other person will be DM 2. Beside the diagram we show whether you are DM 1 or DM 2. In this example, for now, you are DM 1. Please click “Next” to continue.

Page 4

Notice the boxes with letters in them. These letters will be replaced by numbers representing Experimental Dollars during the experiment. For 20 Experimental Dollars you will earn 1 U.S. dollar. The boxes with numbers show the different earnings in Experimental Dollars that you and your counterpart can make. There are two numbers in each box. The number on the top (which is indented now) is DM 1’s earnings if this box is reached. The number on the bottom is DM 2’s earnings.

SCREEN DIAGRAM

You and your counterpart will jointly determine a path through the diagram to an earnings box. Please click “Next” to continue.

Page 5

A path is defined as sequence of moves through the diagram.

A move is a choice of direction in the diagram.

SCREEN DIAGRAM

The arrows in the diagram show the possible directions of moves that can be made. Notice that the moves for both DM 1 and DM 2 are always DOWN or RIGHT. When you click on either arrow, the path is highlighted.

The circles in the diagram with numbers in them indicate who gets to move at that point in the diagram. Please click “Next” to continue.

Page 6

For example, DM 1 starts the process at the top of the diagram by moving right or down. If DM 1 moves right the experiment is over. DM 1 earns ‘zig’ and DM 2 earns ‘zog’.

SCREEN DIAGRAM

If DM 1 moves down, it is DM 2’s turn to move. DM 2 can move right or down. If DM 2 moves right, DM 1 earns ‘wig’ and DM 2 earns ‘wog’. If DM 2 moves down, DM 1 earns ‘xig’ and DM 2 earns ‘xog’.

The decision path that was chosen will be highlighted. Please click “Next” to continue.

Page 7

We will now show you what the decisions look like from the point of view of DM 1. When you are DM 1 you move first. The arrows show you can move right or down. In order to move, click on the arrow for your choice. DM 2 will only see your decision when you click the “Send” button to finalize your decision. To see how this works, click the RIGHT ARROW now. Be sure to click “Send” to finalize your move.

SCREEN DIAGRAM

At this point the moves are over. The path taken is highlighted white and earnings received are highlighted. Please click ‘Next’ to continue.

Page 8

As another example as DM 1, move DOWN by clicking on the arrow. To confirm your move click the “Send” button.

SCREEN DIAGRAM

Once the subject makes the choice, the following appears: Since you moved Down as DM 1, DM 2, seeing your move, now has a decision to make. If DM 2 moves right then you would earn ‘wig’ and DM 2 would earn ‘wog’. If DM 2 moves down then you would earn ‘xig’ and DM 2 would earn ‘xog’. Please click Next to continue.

Page 9

We will now show you what decisions look like from DM 2's point of view. Notice that your earnings are indented and this is the BOTTOM NUMBER in the boxes. You will only have a move if DM 1 moves down. Suppose DM 1 has moved down. You have to decide to move right or down. Please make a choice now by clicking on the arrow of your choice. Then click "Send" to confirm your move.

SCREEN DIAGRAM

Either the subject moves Right as DM 2 in which case she sees the following: Since you moved Right as DM 2, DM 1's earnings are 'wig'. Your earnings are 'wog'. Please click "Next" to continue.

OR the subject moves Down as DM 2 in which case she sees the following: Since you moved Down as DM 2, DM 1's earnings are 'xig'. Your earnings are 'xog'. Please click "Next" to continue.

Page 10**IMPORTANT POINTS:**

- * Each period you will be paired with another individual: your counterpart for that period.
- * You will participate for several periods, being re-paired each period.
- * If you are DM 1, your counterpart will be DM 2. In this case, you will make a decision first. On the other hand, if you are DM 2, your counterpart will be DM 1. If this is the case, you will have a decision to make if DM 1 chooses down.
- * If you are DM 1, your payoff in Experimental Dollars is the top number in the box. If you are DM 2, your payoff in Experimental Dollars is the bottom number in the box. You will receive that amount of money if the box is reached. For every 20 Experimental Dollars you earn, you will receive 1 U.S. Dollar.

This concludes the directions. If you wish to return to them please click the "Back" button. If you have any questions please raise your hand. Otherwise, to begin the experiment, please click the green button, "Finished with directions".